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LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: APPLYING
FEDERAL CORPORATE CHARGING
CONSIDERATIONS TO INDIVIDUALS
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ABSTRACT
The American prison system is grappling with a well-publicized
carceral crisis. In the words of former U.S. Attorney General Eric
Holder, “too many Americans go to too many prisons for far too long,
and for no truly good law enforcement reason.” And, as a result of
developments in federal law over the past few decades, the power of
federal prosecutors to decide when and how to charge individuals with
crimes is crucial to when and how American citizens go to prison.
Many ideas have been proposed to revise prosecutorial
discretionary powers, but few have been heeded by the Department of
Justice (DOJ). However, this Note posits that the DOJ has already
paved the way to enhanced guidance for federal prosecutors when
charging individuals with crimes. This is because the DOJ’s
prosecutorial guidance for charging corporations with federal crimes is
more robust than the guidance for charging individuals. In particular,
a discussion on collateral consequences is included in the corporate
charging guidance, yet lacking in the individual charging guidance.
This enhanced corporate guidance has had the purposeful impact of
curtailing the prosecution of corporate crime. This Note argues that a
similar discussion of collateral consequences in the individual charging
guidance could have important and far-reaching effects on the federal
criminal regime. Perhaps more importantly, such a discussion could
remedy some of the unfairness presented by the current system in which
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federal prosecutors are guided to consider a superior set of factors
before charging corporations with crimes.

INTRODUCTION
In 2008, federal prosecutors charged Carol Anne Bond with using
a chemical weapon1 in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention
Implementation Act of 1998.2 Bond, a Pennsylvanian microbiologist,
had obtained an arsenic-based compound from work and a vial of
potassium dichromate from Amazon online.3 She intended to use the
chemicals to cause an “uncomfortable rash” on her former best friend,
Myrlinda Haynes, after finding out that her own husband was the
father of Haynes’s unborn child.4 Bond’s plan included spreading the
chemicals in locations outside of Haynes’s home, including her
mailbox.5
Though these chemicals are potentially lethal at “high enough
doses,” lethality was never a threat in this case.6 Furthermore, because
the chemicals are extremely visible,7 Haynes simply “avoid[ed]” the
chemicals when she saw them outside of her house.8 In the end, the
only physical injury suffered throughout Bond’s twenty-four failed
attempts to get back at her former best friend was a “minor chemical
burn on [Haynes’s] thumb, which she treated by rinsing with water.”9
For this, Bond received a six-year sentence in federal prison.10

1. Joint Appendix at 13 (Indictment), Bond v. United States, 1315 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (No.
09-1227); see also id. at i (indicating the date of Bond’s indictment).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 229 (2012); see also Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2085 (2014)
(“Federal prosecutors . . . charged Bond with two counts of mail theft . . . . [T]hey also charged
her with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of [18 U.S.C. §]
229(a).”).
3. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. (“Both chemicals are toxic to humans and, in high enough doses, potentially
lethal. It is undisputed, however, that Bond did not intend to kill Haynes.”).
7. See id. (stating that “[t]he chemicals that Bond used are easy to see”); see also PubChem
Open Chemistry Database, Compound Summary for Potassium Dichromate, NAT’L CENTER FOR
BIOTECH. INFO., http://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/24502#section=Top [https://perma.
cc/ARG6-U29C] (describing potassium dichromate as a compound that is “orange to red
colored” and “bright”).
8. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2086. Bond’s sentence has been generally attributed to her chemical-weapons
charge, although she was also charged with two counts of mail theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1708. It is impossible to know the breakdown of her sentence for certain, because the sentencing
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The U.S. Supreme Court overturned Bond’s sentence in 2014,
referring to the federal chemical-weapons charge against her as
“unusual”11 and “surprising.”12 Noting a number of Pennsylvania laws
that allow for local prosecution of her offensive conduct,13 the Court
concluded that a federal prosecution of Bond was neither necessary14
nor appropriate.15 Furthermore, and perhaps central to the holding,16
the Court implied that this case demonstrated an inappropriate
exercise of federal prosecutorial charging power: “[I]n its zeal to
prosecute Bond, the Federal Government has ‘displaced’ the ‘public
policy of . . . [Pennsylvania]’ that Bond does not belong in prison for a
chemical weapons offense.”17
The prosecutor, with all the power of her office, literally holds the
lives of individuals in her hands.18 The job of the federal prosecutor is

documents from her original appeal were sealed. See Defendant-Appellant’s Supplemental Reply
Brief at 4 n.*, On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, Bond v. United States, 681 F.3d 149 (2012) (No. 07-528), rev’d, 1345 S. Ct. 2077
(2014).
11. The Court mentions that this case and the federal chemical-weapons charge are unusual
two separate times in the opinion. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2092 (“[W]ith the exception of this
unusual case, the Federal Government itself has not looked to section 229 to reach purely local
crimes.”); id. at 2093 (“This case is unusual, and our analysis is appropriately limited.”).
12. See id. at 2085 (“Federal prosecutors naturally charged Bond with two counts of mail
theft . . . . More surprising, they also charged her with two counts of possessing and using a
chemical weapon . . . .”).
13. See id. at 2092 (stating first that “Pennsylvania has several statutes that would likely
cover [Bond’s] assault” and then referencing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2701 (2012) (simple assault),
§ 2705 (reckless endangerment), and § 2709 (harassment)).
14. See id. (“It is also clear that the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (and every
other State) are sufficient to prosecute Bond.”).
15. See id. at 2093 (“[T]here are no apparent interests of the United States Congress or the
community of nations in seeing Bond end up in federal prison, rather than dealt with (like
virtually all other criminals in Pennsylvania) by the State.”).
16. See, e.g., Robert J. Anello & Richard F. Albert, Missing Fish, Obstruction Statute and
Prosecutorial Discretion, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
id=1202677879102/Missing-Fish-Obstruction-Statute-and-Prosecutorial-Discretion?slreturn=
20151119114235 [https://perma.cc/PY85-HMTW] (“The Supreme Court’s . . . decision in . . .
[Bond] suggest[s] that some members of the court are deeply troubled by the combination of the
vast reach and severity of federal criminal law and the breadth of prosecutorial discretion.”).
17. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2093 (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011)).
In making this statement, the Court referenced Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion in Jones v.
United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). There, Justice Stevens described how the choice to federally
prosecute a crime, when the federal sentence will be much higher than any sentence imposed at
the local level, “illustrates how a criminal law . . . may effectively displace a policy choice made
by the State” and upsets the federal–state balance. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859 (2000)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
18. See infra Part II.
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inarguably complex: she is “the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done.”19 Yet, for all the momentous complexity of her
decisions, she is guided primarily not by rules, but by suggestions.20 This
is not to imply that a scheme of well-defined rules would make for a
better system, but simply a statement of fact.
Still, in the words of former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder,
“too many Americans go to too many prisons for far too long, and for
no truly good law enforcement reason.”21 And, as a result of
developments in federal law over the past few decades, the power of
federal prosecutors to decide when and how to charge individuals with
crimes is crucial to when and how American citizens go to prison.22
Many ideas have been proposed to revise prosecutorial
discretion,23 but few have been heeded by the Department of Justice
(DOJ).24 However, it is possible that the DOJ itself has already paved
the way to enhanced guidance for federal prosecutors when charging
individuals with crimes. This is because the DOJ’s prosecutorial
guidance for charging corporations with federal crimes is more robust
than the guidance for charging individuals.25 In particular, a discussion
on collateral consequences (the extrajudicial ramifications of
prosecution) is included in the corporate charging guidance, yet lacking
in the individual charging guidance.26 This enhanced corporate
guidance has had the purposeful impact of curtailing the prosecution
of corporate crime.27 The prosecution of individual crime deserves at
least as much purposeful consideration, especially in light of the “too
many Americans” in federal prison.28

19. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
20. See infra Part III.
21. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-eric-holder-delivers-remarks-annual-meeting-american-bar-associations [https://perma.
cc/BQ49-XEFB].
22. See infra Part I.
23. See infra Part III.
24. Generally, lobbying and proposals for reform have been most successful in the area of
corporate crime. See infra Part III.A.
25. See infra Part III.B.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part IV. The increased equitable considerations in corporate charging guidance
have also been the subject of much criticism. See infra Part V.
28. Holder, supra note 21.
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This Note posits that the evolution of corporate prosecutions
during the last two decades demonstrates that the application of
corporate charging guidance to the DOJ’s individual charging guidance
could have important and far-reaching effects on the federal criminal
regime. First, Parts I and II explain why federal charging discretion is
crucial to Americans going to prison. Part I details how federal
prosecutorial power increased with the emphasis on determinative
sentencing starting in the 1980s. This Part then discusses the real stakes
of charging discretion and the large-order effects of federal
prosecutions. Part II reviews the general origins of, and current
controls for, prosecutorial charging power.
Then, moving to the charging power of federal prosecutors
specifically, Part III discusses the different guidance used for charging
individuals and corporations with crimes. Part IV discusses the
difference that guidance makes. Lastly, Part V describes how and why
we should level the playing field by applying corporate charging
considerations to individuals.
I. THE RISE AND STAKES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL CHARGING
POWER
A. The Rise of Federal Charging Power
Federal prosecutorial power increased substantially after the
implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the late 1980s.
Though the Sentencing Guidelines were designed to make federal
sentencing more uniform by removing judicial discretion, they had the
real effect of transferring discretionary power from federal judges to
federal prosecutors.29
The implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines began in 1984,
when Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA).30 The SRA
was a bipartisan initiative,31 a product of a mounting demand for
greater uniformity and “truth” in federal sentencing during the 1970s
and 1980s.32 The SRA instituted the U.S. Sentencing Commission
29. See infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text.
30. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3551 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98).
31. J.C. Oleson, Blowing out All the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth Birthday
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 696 (2011).
32. See id. at 698 (explaining that the SRA was “conceived at a moment in U.S. history when
the belief in indeterminate sentencing yielded to the belief in determinate sentencing”). Professor
Oleson claims it is not “mere coincidence that Robert Martinson published his infamous ‘What
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(USSC), which was responsible for promulgating the new Guidelines.33
This new system was designed to eliminate the “unwarranted
sentencing disparity”34 that arose when judges had wide-ranging
discretion in determining a defendant’s prison sentence.35 With this
broad judicial discretion, “[t]he length of time a person spent in prison
appeared to depend on ‘what the judge ate for breakfast’ on the day of
sentencing, on which judge you got, or on other factors that should not
have made a difference to the length of the sentence.”36
The SRA “fixed” these unwarranted sentencing disparities with
the Sentencing Guidelines, which were effectively mandatory for all
federal judges.37 The Guidelines consist of a sentencing grid, with

Works?’ article (thereby sounding the death knell for the rehabilitative movement in the United
States) just one year before Senator Kennedy launched the legislative initiative that would
culminate in [the SRA’s] passage[,]” but rather that “penology and attendant sentencing practices
were changing” and “both Martinson’s article and Kennedy’s initiative tapped into that shifting
zeitgeist.” Id. (citations omitted); see id. at 700 (“By the early 1970s, some critics began to
condemn the horror stories about identical offenders before different judges, one who received a
sentence of probation while the other was sentenced to imprisonment.”). Professor Oleson also
notes that this type of sentencing was condemned by Judge Marvin Frankel as “‘judicial
lawlessness’ in 1972, and soon thereafter, the retributive calls for parity and predictability began
to drown out the rehabilitative charge for transformation.” Id. at 700–01 (citing Marvin E.
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1972)).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2012). See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1690 (1992) (“[T]he SRA
established as the centerpiece of reform a specialized administrative agency, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, to become expert in sentencing research and to devise guidelines for federal
judges.”).
34. See Oleson, supra note 31, at 702 (“Indeed, it has been said that the primary goal of the
Guidelines was the reduction of unwarranted sentencing disparity.”); see also supra note 32 and
accompanying text (discussing widespread calls for greater sentencing uniformity in the years
preceding the SRA).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Before the
implementation of a Guidelines-based sentencing system in 1984, ‘[s]tatutes specified the
penalties for crimes but nearly always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to decide whether
the offender should be incarcerated and for how long . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989))). These statutes also determined “whether
[the recipient of the sentence] should be fined and how much, and whether some lesser restraint,
such as probation, should be imposed instead of imprisonment or fine.” Id. (quoting Mistretta, 488
U.S. at 363).
36. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 332 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
37. Although federal judges technically retained the authority to sentence a defendant
outside of the Guidelines range, this discretion was subject to stringent conditions, congressional
monitoring, and strict appellate review. See, e.g., Freed, supra note 33, at 1697 (“Displacing much
of the discretion available in the past, the [Sentencing Guidelines], together with the underlying
statute, hold[] the judge accountable for every sentencing choice. He must state reasons for each
sentence, including a ‘specific reason’ for some sentences, and his decision is subject to appellate
scrutiny.” (citations omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (2012))); see also United States v.
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sentence lengths graduated by the crime committed and the
defendant’s characteristics.38 Inside the resulting matrix, sentences are
prescribed within a narrow range.39 To sentence a defendant, all a
federal judge needed to do was “select a sentence from within the
[narrow] guideline range”40—thus, the judge’s power to make
sentencing decisions was severely constrained.41
For federal prosecutors, however, this highly structured
sentencing scheme led to an increase in power.42 The charges brought
and facts presented by the prosecutor were key, because they were, in
effect, the equivalent of choosing the defendant’s sentence.43 Though
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the mandatory nature of the
Sentencing Guidelines in 2005,44 the Guidelines remain an essential
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005) (“We do not doubt that Congress, when it wrote the [SRA],
intended to create a form of mandatory Guidelines system.”).
38. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
39. See id. (“Where the guidelines call for imprisonment, the range must be narrow: the
maximum of the range cannot exceed the minimum by more than the greater of 25 percent or six
months.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2012) (“If a sentence specified by the guidelines
includes a term of imprisonment, the maximum of the range established for such a term shall not
exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months . . . .”).
40. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2.
41. See Oleson, supra note 31, at 713 (“Judges who . . . tried to sentence below the
Guidelines were stymied unless there existed a mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.”). Professor Oleson
further notes that “[e]ven then, in deciding whether a factor had been adequately taken into
consideration, judges were permitted to consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.” Id. (citation omitted). It is
this “draconian nature” that “may explain why Justice Kennedy publicly condemned the
harshness of the Guidelines and praised judges who found ways to exercise their departure
authority.” Id.; see also id. at 725 (“[A]s soon as a judge departed downward from a Guidelines
sentence . . . he would be reversed, even if the departure had been applied to redress sentencing
disparity created by the unequal promulgation of [DOJ district-specific] programs.”).
42. See, e.g., id. at 718 (“Having great leverage, prosecutors . . . controlled Guidelines
sentencing far more than they had during the pre-Guidelines era.”).
43. See Freed, supra note 33, at 1723 (explaining the concept of “relevant conduct” under
the Sentencing Guidelines and noting that the “[d]iscretionary decisions of Assistant U.S.
Attorneys, both as to charges and as to factual allegations, [could] powerfully expand or limit the
judge’s ambit for sentencing”).
44. The Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional as
written because they required the imposition of sentences based upon additional facts that
sentencing judges found by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (“[W]e must sever and excise . . . the provision [of the Sentencing Guidelines]
that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range (in
the absence of circumstances that justify a departure) . . . .”). This imposition violated the Court’s
Sixth Amendment holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey that “any fact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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part of the federal sentencing process.45 Furthermore, they remain
highly persuasive. Studies show that courts have largely continued to
sentence defendants within the prescribed Guidelines ranges, despite
their nonmandatory nature.46 This means that prosecutors continue to
wield a certain determinative power with their decision to charge an
individual with a particular violation of the law.47
Moreover, the number of violations a federal prosecutor can
choose from when charging someone with a crime is so enormous that
it is essentially countless.48 The enormous number of federal laws

45. See Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 351 (2009) (“[T]he sentencing court must first
calculate the Guidelines range, and then consider what sentence is appropriate for the individual
defendant in light of the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), explaining any variance
from the former with reference to the latter.” (emphasis added)).
46. See, e.g., Norman C. Bay, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Post-Booker World, 37
MCGEORGE L. REV. 549, 570 (2006) (“[P]ost-Booker sentencing statistics show that, by and large,
courts continue to sentence defendants within the relevant Guidelines range.”); Oleson, supra
note 31, at 740 (using 2008 data from the USSC to explain that “[a]lthough data from the
Commission suggests that national sentencing patterns have not changed dramatically after
Booker, some circuits are showing greater fidelity to Guidelines sentencing than others” (citation
omitted)).
47. Although the determinative nature of the Guidelines (and, to some extent, the less
determinative nature of the “advisory” Guidelines) placed great power into the hands of the
prosecutor, this is not to say that the prosecutor’s decision to charge has not always been a source
of great power. See infra Part II. Additionally, mandatory-minimum laws (laws which carry an
obligatory minimum sentence upon conviction, adding to the prosecutor’s “determinative”
powers) are also on the rise and contributing to federal prison population growth. A 2014
Congressional Research Services (CRS) report noted that “the number of mandatory minimum
penalties in the federal criminal code nearly doubled from 98 to 195 from 1991 to 2011.” NATHAN
JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION BUILDUP 8
(2014). The CRS also reported that “the USSC found that, compared to FY1990 (43.6%), a larger
proportion of defendants convicted of offenses that carried a mandatory minimum penalty in
FY2010 (55.5%) were convicted of offenses that carried a mandatory minimum penalty of five
years or more.” Id.
48. See, e.g., Regulatory Crime: Solutions: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task
Force of 2013 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 21 (2013) (statement of Lucian E.
Dervan, Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law) (stating that “currently
over 4,450 criminal offenses [exist] in the United States Code and as many as 300,000 federal
regulatory crimes”); Michael Cottone, Rethinking Presumed Knowledge of the Law in the
Regulatory Age, 82 TENN. L. REV. 137, 141 (2014) (estimating the number of federal criminal laws
at between 3,000 and 4,500); Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Many Failed Efforts to Count
Nation’s Federal Criminal Laws, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304319804576389601079728920 [https://perma.cc/7UPD-4C9J] (describing the
American Bar Association’s 1998 failed attempt to count all of the federal criminal laws in
existence and estimating the number of federal regulations alone at 10,000 to 300,000); see also
Oleson, supra note 31, at 712 (stating that sentences operate on a “one-way ratchet,” tending to
increase over time, “because ‘the story of American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation
between prosecutors and legislators, each of whom benefits from more and broader crimes, and
growing marginalization of judges, who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability rules rather
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(commonly referred to as “over-federalization”)49 makes it very likely
that most Americans are in violation of some law.50 This means that the
federal prosecution of anyone is a matter of choice—a choice that
belongs to the prosecutor.51 The result, because “most Americans are
criminals and don’t know it,” has been a de facto power of criminal
determination exercised by federal prosecutors.52
B. The Stakes of Federal Charging Power
Lately, this de facto power has contributed to “too many
Americans go[ing] to too many prisons for far too long.”53 The federal
criminal system is overflowing with convicted individuals54: the federal
prison population has grown 800 percent since 1980.55 This has

than broader ones’” (quoting William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 525–26 (2001))).
49. See, e.g., Task Force Urged to Curb Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, U.S. COURTS
(July
11,
2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2014/07/11/task-force-urged-curb-overfederalization-criminal-law [https://perma.cc/XV53-UMPF] (“[T]he over-federalization of
criminal law . . . is a cause of overcrowding in federal prisons.”).
50. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN
THE NAME OF JUSTICE: LEADING EXPERTS REEXAMINE THE CLASSIC ARTICLE “THE AIMS OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW” 43, 50 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009) (“Under [a system in which most people
have committed some crime carrying serious consequences,] the authorities necessarily have vast
discretion to choose who will remain free, well-respected members of society and who will be
tossed in jail and lose their rights, their family, and their job.”); George Will, The Plague of
Overcriminalization, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/394392/
plague-overcriminalization-george-will [https://perma.cc/67BP-B4MX?type=image] (stating that
“Harvey Silverglate, a civil-liberties attorney, titled his 2009 book Three Felonies a Day to indicate
how easily we can fall afoul of America’s metastasizing body of criminal laws” and that “Professor
Douglas Husak of Rutgers University says that approximately 70 percent of American adults
have, usually unwittingly, committed a crime for which they could be imprisoned”).
51. See infra Part II.
52. Kozinski & Tseytlin, supra note 50, at 44.
53. Holder, supra note 21.
54. See infra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
55. Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_
statistics.jsp [https://perma.cc/XC83-5KGC] (showing that the number of federal prisoners has
grown from 24,640 in 1980 to 214,149 in 2014). 2014 actually marked the first decrease in federal
prison population in over thirty-five years, as the 2013 population was 219,298. Id. This decrease
is likely the result of a 5 percent decrease in admissions for federal prisons in 2014. Key Statistic:
Prisoners, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty+pbdetail&iid=5387 [https://perma.cc/3WU3-6XQ4]. Although
the number of American citizens prosecuted federally has, in fact, been on the decrease since
2012, this has been largely attributed to policies driven by the Obama administration, including
former U.S. Attorney General Holder. Whether or not these policies will endure with the next
administration remains an open question. See infra notes 184–88 and accompanying text.
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translated to an overcrowded56 and underfunded57 federal prison
system. Enhancing the guidance federal prosecutors use when charging
individuals with crimes could help to reduce the number of Americans
in prison and alleviate some of these crowding and funding issues.
More importantly, enhanced guidance could lessen sentencing
disparities by integrating social-policy concerns that are ignored by the
DOJ’s current individual charging guidance.
These social-policy concerns have arisen from the collateral
effects of incarcerating a large number of Americans in both federal
and state penitentiaries.58 The effects are tied to the collateral
consequences of conviction, accumulated on a mass level.59 Collateral
consequences of conviction are those imposed by authoritative bodies
other than the court.60 For example, “sex offender registration, civil
56. The 2014 report for the Congressional Research Service shows that, on the macro level,
the federal prison system was 36 percent over its rated capacity in fiscal year 2013. JAMES, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., supra note 47, at 2. However, high-security male prisons operated at 52 percent
overcapacity and medium-security male facilities operated at 45 percent overcapacity. Id. at 21.
The report explains:
Data show that overcrowding in BOP facilities started to increase after FY1997, and it
peaked in FY2004 when overcrowding was at 41%. . . . Overcrowding remained around
35% between FY2005 and FY2010 after a steady growth between FY1997 and FY2004.
However, prison overcrowding increased to 39% by the end of FY2011, the highest
level since FY2004. Prison overcrowding decreased slightly in FY2012 (38%) and
FY2013 (36%), due to a decrease in the institutional prison population (between
FY2011 and FY2013 there were 1,085 fewer inmates held in BOP facilities), an increase
in the number of beds (the BOP added 1,931 beds between FY2011 and FY2013), and
greater use of contract bedspace (there were 2,615 more inmates in contract facilities
in FY2013 than there were in FY2011).
Id. at 19.
57. The 2014 report also explains:
[T]he BOP’s appropriations increased more than $6.544 billion from FY1980 ($330
million) to FY2014 ($6.874 billion). Between FY1980 and FY2014, the average annual
increase in the BOP’s appropriation was approximately $192 million. The data show
that, by and large, growth in the BOP’s appropriation is the result of ever-growing
appropriations for the [Salaries and Expenses] account. This is not surprising
considering the constant growth in the federal prison population and the fact that the
S&E account provides funding for the care of federal inmates.
Id. at 10.
58. See, e.g., Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, Teaching the Carceral Crisis: An Ethical and
Pedagogical Imperative, 13 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 104, 105–07 (2013).
59. See generally Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/the-black-familyin-the-age-of-mass-incarceration/403246 [https://perma.cc/4J7Q-WXUX] (discussing the massive
level of Americans in prison, the collateral consequences of imprisonment, and the resulting effect
on the population, particularly on African American families).
60. Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 784–86 (2016)
(explaining the difference between direct and collateral consequences of conviction and noting
that “collateral consequences ‘are not part of the explicit punishment handed down by the court;
they stem from the fact of conviction rather than from the sentence of the court’” (quoting Padilla
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commitment, . . . disqualification from public benefits (such as public
housing or food assistance), ineligibility for business and professional
licenses, termination or limitation of parental rights, and—for
noncitizen defendants—deportation” are just some of the
consequences of conviction imposed not judicially, but by other
authoritative bodies.61
The simplest solution for reining in the federal criminal regime
may be to decrease the number of federal criminal laws on the books.
However, “political support remains small for . . . repealing federal
laws.”62 This reluctance has historical origins, first emerging with force
during the civil rights era when conservatives employed “phrases like
‘crime in the streets’ and ‘law and order’ [to equate] political dissent
with crime.”63 A resulting “tough on crime” mentality grabbed ahold
of many Americans64 and subsists today.65 In the face of this lingering
“tough on crime” American mentality and the ever-growing amount of
federal legislation, it is unlikely that the solution to the “too many
Americans” in federal prison will be achieved by repealing criminal
laws. Therefore, an alternative solution (and this Note) focuses on
enhancing prosecutorial charging discretion.

v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010))); Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly
Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634 (2006).
61. Crane, supra note 60, at 785.
62. Kozinski & Tseytlin, supra note 50, at 55.
63. KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 48 (2004); see also Coates, supra note 59 (stating that, after the
1960s, “[t]he incarceration rate rose independent of crime—but not of criminal-justice policy,”
and discussing how imprisonment rates in recent decades do not follow the rise and fall of crime
rates).
64. BECKETT & SASSON, supra note 63, at 49 (stating that it “appear[s] that the tough
anticrime rhetoric struck a chord among some voters; those opposed to social and racial reform
were especially receptive to calls for law and order”).
65. See Jill Mizell, Overview of Public Opinion, in THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, AN
OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC OPINION AND DISCOURSE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES 7, 20 (Aug.
2014), https://opportunityagenda.org/files/field_file/2014.08.23-CriminalJusticeReport-FINAL_
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/L383-H6UV] (“A new study by The Opportunity Agenda found that just
more than half of Americans (54 percent) believe society is better served by harsher punishment
for people convicted of crimes, and 46 percent believe society is better served by a greater effort
to rehabilitate people convicted of crimes.”). However, declining levels in the majority support
for harsher punishments may indicate a coming shift in public opinion. See, e.g., id. at 24
(“Enforcement and punishment-oriented approaches to crime have been perceived as politically
appealing over the past 30 years, but in recent years these policies have not matched up with
public ideas of an effective criminal justice system.”). This shift is also evidenced not by a decrease
in the number of federal criminal laws, but by an effort in Congress to reduce the severity of some
federal sentences. See infra Part IV.B.
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II. PROSECUTORIAL CHARGING DISCRETION GENERALLY
In the American criminal-justice system, several types of officials
have the power to make far-reaching discretionary decisions.66 But it is
the prosecutor’s office alone that decides whether charges will be
brought against a potential defendant, and what those charges will be.67
The discretionary power of the American prosecutor owes itself
to European origins.68 The power to decline to prosecute harkens from
the British principle of nolle prosequi, which resided solely with the
English attorney general.69 The American criminal-justice system fully
embraced this principle, extending it to not only attorneys general, but
all prosecutors.70 Accordingly, courts upheld the ability of prosecutors
to decline to prosecute in early cases such as The Confiscation Cases,71
and definitively declared as early as 1925 that a court may not force a
prosecutor to bring charges.72

66. See generally Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and
Misconduct, 23 CRIM. JUST. 24, 26–27 (2009) (excerpt from ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY
JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007)) (discussing the discretion
afforded by the criminal-justice system to judges, prosecutors, and the police).
67. Peter Krug, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports
to the XVIth International Congress of Comparative Law: Section V Prosecutorial Discretion and
Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 645 (2002). Prosecutors have the discretionary power to make
other decisions as well—they decide which documents will be provided to the defense counsel
during discovery, what information will be released to the press, whether the defendant’s property
will be seized in accordance with forfeiture statutes, and whether to petition the court to reduce
a defendant’s sentence for “substantial assistance.” See Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the
Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 557–68
(1999) (discussing the different areas throughout the criminal trial process in which prosecutors
exercise discretion).
68. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
717, 728 (1996) (“Like the English Attorney General, the American prosecutor has the power to
terminate all criminal prosecutions. Like the French procureur publique, the [American]
prosecutor has the power to initiate all public prosecutions. Similar to the Dutch schout, the
[American] prosecutor is a local official of a regional government.” (citations omitted)).
69. Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty,
and the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 401 (2008). Nolle prosequi translates to
“unwilling to pursue.” Id. This principle gave the attorney general “the power to end a
prosecution without court inquiry.” Id.
70. Id.
71. The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868).
72. See Milliken v. Stone, 7 F.2d 397, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), aff’d, 16 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1927)
(“Furthermore, the federal courts are without power to compel the prosecuting officers to enforce
the penal laws, whatever the grounds of their failure may be. The remedy for inactivity of that
kind is with the executive and ultimately with the people.”).
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Of the decisions entrusted to the prosecutor, the decision to
charge an individual is arguably the most powerful.73 It is also virtually
unreviewable.74 Consequently, limited legal avenues exist to provide a
remedy to the defendant who may have been incorrectly charged.75 The
Supreme Court has held that prosecutors have absolute immunity from
civil suits arising from wrongful decisions to charge,76 and established a
purposely “demanding” standard for defendants who claim to have
been targeted for prosecution for impermissible discriminatory
reasons.77 As the Supreme Court has stated, “courts are ‘properly
hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.’”78 As a result,
“in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that
[prosecutors] have properly discharged their official duties.”79
The merits of entrusting prosecutors with such broad,
unreviewable power have been debated at length.80 Those who argue
against the prosecutor’s unfettered discretion to charge maintain that
this power is more dangerous than beneficial, producing disparate

73. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, BYU L.
REV. 669, 671 (1992) (“The decision to charge an individual with a crime is the most important
function exercised by a prosecutor.”); Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of
Prosecutorial Charging Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion—Knowing There
Will Be Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371, 403 (2000) (“The prosecutor’s
office has become the most powerful office in the criminal justice system. Nowhere is this power
more evident than in the areas of charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing.”).
74. Krug, supra note 67, at 648 (2002) (“Although judicial mechanisms exist in the U.S. legal
systems for individuals to compel a prosecutor to bring charges, it is generally accepted that they
are used infrequently and are rarely successful.”); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior:
Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
851, 862 (1995) (“The prosecutor’s decision to charge an accused is largely subject to the
prosecutor’s discretion. The prosecutor’s charging discretion is, for the most part, unreviewable.
So long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense,
the prosecutor is entitled to bring the charge.”).
75. Krug, supra note 67, at 645–50.
76. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); see Krug, supra note 67, at 648 (discussing
the limited avenues available to challenge prosecutorial discretion).
77. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996).
78. Id. at 465 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
79. Id. at 464 (quoting United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)).
80. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision
Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1662–63 (2010) (“There is a dated notion—both
untenable and unattractive—that executive actors in the criminal justice system should be
stripped of all discretion. Even in its day, it was a controversial proposition. Today, the argument
is almost wholly rejected.”); Meares, supra note 74, at 863 (“The reasons underlying the
prosecutor’s vast discretion have been well documented by commentators . . . .”); Sarat & Clarke,
supra note 69, at 389 (“This emphasis on, and debate over, discretion is not new.”).
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results81 from incontrovertible personal incentives and biases.82
Advocates of preserving the broad powers of the prosecutor stress both
practical and equitable needs for flexibility.83 These arguments
underscore the necessity of balancing overcriminalization84 and the
insufficient resources of prosecutors’ offices.85 These advocates
contend that the procedural mechanisms available to deal with
prosecutorial misconduct are sufficient, or could be, if properly
employed.86

81. Misner, supra note 68, at 761 (“Sometimes barely concealed in the debate on discretion
and its fine points are what may be the real issues: why does the United States have a criminal
justice system which incarcerates minorities at a disproportionately high rate?”).
82. See generally Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes III: Personnel Policies
and Conflicts of Interest in Prosecutors’ Offices, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53 (2012)
(discussing how police personnel policies fuel criminal overcharging); Douglas Noll, Controlling
a Prosecutor’s Screening Discretion Through Fuller Enforcement, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 697, 698–
99 (1978) (arguing that current checks on prosecutorial discretion are inadequate and heightened
checks are therefore warranted); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1554–60 (1981) (advocating for increased Due Process scrutiny of
prosecutorial discretion to check prosecutorial power).
83. See generally Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 369 (2010) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion is a desirable tool that can be
used to overcome inequities associated with the indeterminacy of language in legal rules). The
U.S. Supreme Court has also indicated that flexibility is needed to foster equitable charging
decisions. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 794 (1977) (“The decision to file criminal
charges, with the awesome consequences it entails, requires consideration of a wide range of
factors in addition to the strength of the Government’s case, in order to determine whether
prosecution would be in the public interest.”).
84. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 80, at 1665 (“Put succinctly, substantive overcriminalization
increases not only the need for equitable discretion, but also the risk of its misuse or abuse.”).
85. See, e.g., Misner, supra note 68, at 760 (“Some supporters of the broad role of
prosecutorial discretion do so from the practical point of view that a system of lessened
prosecutorial discretion would result in a need for heightened resources for the inevitable increase
in criminal trials.”).
86. See, e.g., Charles E. MacLean & Stephen Wilks, Keeping Arrows in the Quiver: Mapping
the Contours of Prosecutorial Discretion, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 59, 62 (2012) (“Our preliminary
assessment suggests that current, albeit imperfect, accountability mechanisms can be used to
sanction errant prosecutors.”). MacClean and Wilks have explained that mechanisms for holding
prosecutors accountable do exist:
Although our data gathering continues, it is already clear that prosecutors are regularly
held personally accountable for misconduct in office, most notably through sanctions
against the prosecutors’ licenses to practice law; this is despite the high threshold for
securing civil remedies against prosecutors under § 1983. . . . Scholars’ preoccupation
with controversial or exceptional cases of prosecutorial misconduct is not only
insufficient, but it does a disservice to lawyers, defendants, marginalized communities,
the general public, and other affected stakeholders whose interests remain part of this
conversation. While academics may dispute their efficacy, mechanisms for sanctioning
prosecutorial misconduct do exist.
Id. at 81.
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Nonetheless, advocates and opponents alike have offered
suggestions as to how prosecutorial charging discretion (and
prosecutorial discretion in general) should be modified to ensure
justice is being served. Suggestions for discretion reform come in two
main varieties: ex ante and ex post. Ex ante reformers focus on what
could, and arguably should, be done before a prosecutor ever arrives
at a discretionary decision point. Ex post reformers focus on ways to
guide or limit the discretionary power of prosecutors once a decision
point has arisen.
In the ex ante category, popular suggestions have included
reforming education,87 heightening hiring criteria,88 and changing the
culture of prosecutors’ offices.89 The scholars behind these suggestions
generally reason that effective control of discretion must come from
within.90 These ex ante reforms are largely designed to work with the
systems already in place by proposing changes to the practical, human
element of prosecution: the prosecutor herself.91 This can be
juxtaposed with the goals of ex post reforms, which focus on applying
external controls to prosecutors.
Popular suggestions for ex post reforms have included legislative
solutions,92 judicial remedies,93 and official office policies94 or
87. Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 56, 57 (1971); Ellen S.
Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1511, 1514–15 (2000).
88. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 693–94 (2006); Laurie
L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors,
26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 568 (1999).
89. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 455–58 (1992);
Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 643–44
(1999). But see Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets
Brady, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1133, 1153–54 (2005) (arguing that though the solution to
prosecutorial-discretion issues may be a cultural fix, no solution exists within the American
adversarial model which would cure the prosecutorial culture of its unjust, competitive nature).
90. See Levenson, supra note 88, at 568 (noting that prosecutorial-discretion “decisions are
generally intuitive”); Podgor, supra note 87, at 1515 (“The key to changing the culture of an office
is to have federal prosecutors consider ethics and professionalism in making all decisions.”).
91. See Podgor, supra note 87, at 1514 n.20 (explaining that “this Article is limited to
proposing a solution within the existing structure”).
92. David Boerner, Sentencing Guidelines and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 JUDICATURE
196, 200 (1995); Meares, supra note 74, at 901–02; Misner, supra note 68, at 720–22.
93. Leonetti, supra note 82, at 82–87; Doug Lieb, Note, Vindicating Vindictiveness:
Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining, Past and Future, 123 YALE L.J. 1014, 1020–21
(2014).
94. Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 262–63 (2001);
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 129 (2008).
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memoranda.95 Of these, official office memoranda are most often
suggested specifically for federal prosecution (as opposed to state or
local prosecution).96 This is likely because federal prosecutorial
discretion is guided primarily by the United States Attorneys’ Manual
(USAM),97 which is often updated through official memoranda issued
by the DOJ.98
The USAM provides prosecutorial guidance for both individual
and corporate crimes; however, as will be discussed in the next Part,
the discussions allocated to each are not equal. The following Parts will
explain the differences between the prosecutorial charging guidance
for individual crimes and the guidance for corporate crimes, and then
discuss why these differences should be resolved.
III. CHARGING DISCRETION AND GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS
In the federal context, some aspects of charging discretion apply
regardless of whether the defendant is an individual or a corporation.
First, the decision to charge a crime is a product of prosecutorial
discretion alone, although cases may be referred to a prosecutor from
a variety of sources.99 This can be contrasted with charging decisions
made by prosecutors at local levels, which arrive to prosecutors only
because another official, usually law enforcement, has already

95. Michael A. Caves, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Obligatory Charging Under the Ashcroft
Memo, 9 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 1, 19–20 (2008); Mark Osler, This Changes Everything: A Call
for a Directive, Goal-Oriented Principle to Guide the Exercise of Discretion by Federal
Prosecutors, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 625, 627 (2005); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as
Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1013 (2005); Fred C.
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44
VAND. L. REV. 45, 49–50 (1991); Brandon K. Crase, Note, When Doing Justice Isn’t Enough:
Reinventing the Guidelines for Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 483–86
(2007).
96. See, e.g., Caves, supra note 95, at 19–20 (proposing that changes to prosecutorial
discretion be made through the issuance of an office memorandum); Osler, supra note 95, at 627
(proposing the same).
97. See infra Part III.A.
98. See infra note 101.
99. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 04-422, U.S. ATTORNEYS:
PERFORMANCE-BASED INITIATIVES ARE EVOLVING 15 (2004) (“U.S. Attorneys receive most of
their criminal referrals, or ‘matters,’ from federal investigative agencies or become aware of
criminal activities in the course of investigating or prosecuting other cases . . . . [T]he U.S.
Attorney’s Office decides the appropriateness of bringing criminal charges and, if deemed
appropriate, initiates prosecutions.”).
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exercised charging discretion.100 This distinction serves to distinguish
the power of federal prosecutors in making charging decisions, beyond
even the broad discretionary power of other prosecutors.
Second, after making the decision to hold a corporation or
individual responsible for a crime, federal prosecutors often choose a
defendant’s charges based upon not only culpable conduct, but the
punishment that the charges carry as well.101 The defendant seldom
chooses to go to trial after being charged, and instead elects the lessrisky option of entering into a plea agreement.102
Of course, in plea agreements, the prosecutor has the majority of
the power in determining the terms of the bargain.103 The defendant’s
choices are usually limited to accepting the agreement or not.104
Furthermore, if a binding plea agreement is settled upon, the
prosecutor arguably wields even more power—after the defendant
accepts the bargain, the only step left is the judge’s verification (or
rejection) of the agreement.105 Everything, including the sentence, has
already been determined by the prosecutor.106 However, much of the
similarity between the federal prosecutions of corporations and
individuals ends here. As described in the remainder of this Part, the
corporate charging guidance is more detailed, more updated, and more
100. See Melilli, supra note 73, at 676 (discussing the independent analysis a local prosecutor
must apply when reviewing police charging decisions).
101. See, e.g., Jonathan Drew, Military Selects Rarely Used Charge for Bergdahl Case,
YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/military-selects-rarely-used-chargebergdahl-case-144326544.html [http://perma.cc/AEY3-UYPU] (“For Bergdahl, the Article 99
offense allows the prosecutors to seek a stiffer penalty than the desertion charge, which in this
case carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S.
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (2015) § 9-27.300(A) (Selecting Charges—Charging Most Serious
Offenses) [hereinafter USAM] (“[I]n determining [charges], it is appropriate that the attorney
for the government consider, inter alia, such factors as the Sentencing Guideline range yielded by
the charge . . . .”).
102. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 DATAFILE, TABLE 11: GUILTY PLEAS AND
TRIALS IN EACH PRIMARY OFFENSE CATEGORY, FISCAL YEAR 2013, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/Table11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/887E-YA7P] (explaining that 96 percent of federal criminal defendants enter
into a plea bargain instead of going to trial according to data as of 2013).
103. Bay, supra note 46, at 554 (“If the parties enter into plea negotiations, the prosecutor
wields the discretion to control the terms of an offer.”).
104. Id.
105. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3); see Wes R. Porter, The Pendulum in Federal Sentencing Can
Also Swing Toward Predictability: A Renewed Role for Binding Plea Agreements Post-Booker, 37
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 469, 493 (2011) (discussing how the use of binding plea agreements was
limited under the Sentencing Guidelines, but may be expanded post-Booker, as the Guidelines
are only advisory).
106. See supra note 105.
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considerate of the larger effects of prosecution than the individual
charging guidance.
A. Charging Individuals with Federal Crimes
When charging individuals with crimes, mandatory rules shaping
federal prosecutors’ decisions are limited.107 Unquestionably,
prosecutors may not selectively prosecute individuals on the basis of
race, religion, or any other “arbitrary classification” or protected
right.108 Beyond the impermissibility of such selective prosecution,
however, the charging discretion of federal prosecutors is largely
subject to nonmandatory guidelines.109

107. See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 999 (1995) (“The United States
Attorneys’ Manual . . . does contain some general standards for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, but they are written so broadly that they provide little guidance.”); see also
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“In our system, so long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion.”).
108. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (quoting Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at
364). Although, as noted in Part II, prevailing on a claim of selective prosecution is difficult, and
some scholars espouse the opinion that it has yet to be accomplished on the grounds of race. See
Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts About Yick Wo, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1359, 1361 (2008) (“[T]here are ‘no reported federal or state cases since 1886 that had dismissed
a criminal prosecution on the ground that the prosecutor acted for racial reasons.’” (quoting
DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 159 (1999))); see also Melissa L. Jampol, Note, Goodbye to the
Defense of Selective Prosecution, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 932, 932 (1997) (arguing that
“the Supreme Court’s decision in [Armstrong] impose[d] a barrier that is too high for almost any
defendant alleging selective prosecution to obtain discovery, thus making the already difficult
claim of race-based selective prosecution virtually impossible to prove”).
109. See USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.001 (stating that the USAM’s “principles of [f]ederal
prosecution . . . . have been cast in general terms with a view to providing guidance rather than to
mandating results” with the intent to “assure regularity with regimentation”); id. § 9-27.140
(stating that “United States Attorneys . . . may modify or depart from the principles [of federal
prosecution within the USAM] as necessary in the interests of fair and effective law
enforcement”); Osler, supra note 95, at 626. Osler notes:
What guides federal prosecutors in exercising this discretion? One would think there
would be an easy answer, a directive, goal-oriented principle that would consistently
guide those important choices. There is not. Rather, discretion is exercised in an
inconsistent manner by local U.S. Attorneys and Assistant U.S. Attorneys, who each
employ their own distinctive and personal set of guiding principles.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The primary source of this guidance is the USAM.110 The USAM
contains (self-described) comprehensive, internal guidance,111
organized into nine titles.112 Title 9 of the USAM contains the
guidelines for U.S. Attorneys in criminal matters, including the
Principles of Federal Prosecution (Individual Principles).113
Recognizing that “[t]he manner in which [f]ederal prosecutors exercise
their decision-making authority has far-reaching implications,” the
Individual Principles seek to outline considerations for prosecutors in
the major areas of prosecutorial decisionmaking: prosecuting,
charging, sentencing, and negotiating plea bargains and
nonprosecution agreements.114
Several scholars have surmised that these outlined considerations
leave something to be desired in terms of guidance, depending on how
one views the appropriate scope of prosecutorial discretion.115 The
Individual Principles were first published in 1980, under Attorney
General Benjamin R. Civiletti,116 seven years before the Sentencing
Guidelines were originally published.117 Although the Individual
Principles have since been updated “to reflect changes in the law and
current policy of [the DOJ],”118 a comprehensive discussion of
110. See USAM, supra note 101, §§ 1-1.100–1.200 (stating that the USAM is “intended to be
comprehensive,” so that if “the [USAM] conflicts with earlier Department statements, except for
Attorney General’s statements, the [USAM] will control”); Osler, supra note 95, at 633 (“There
are two national sources for guiding principles for prosecutors who actually try cases, including:
Directives from the Attorney General and the [USAM] . . . . These two, of course, are mutually
reinforcing—directives from the Attorney General will presumably be incorporated into the
[USAM].”).
111. See USAM, supra note 101, §§ 1-1.100–1.200 (stating that “[t]he [USAM] provides only
internal Department of Justice guidance” and that it is “intended to be comprehensive,” so that
if “the [USAM] conflicts with earlier Department statements, except for Attorney General’s
statements, the [USAM] will control”).
112. Id. § 1-1.400.
113. Id. § 9-1.000.
114. Id. § 9-27.110(A).
115. See, e.g., Osler, supra note 95, at 626–27 (“[I]n the end [the DOJ] fails to direct any kind
of principled, consistent exercise of discretion by hundreds of federal prosecutors. Instead, those
prosecutors revolve in their own orbits of personal morality, a constellation of independent stars
and galaxies each with their own hue of light.”).
116. USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.001.
117. The Sentencing Guidelines were first published in 1987. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 1A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).
118. USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.001. Of the updates to the Principles since their
publication in 1980, perhaps the most notable came in 2003 under Attorney General Ashcroft.
The Ashcroft memo (subsequently codified at USAM § 9-27.300) established a regime in which
a prosecutor was obligated to charge an individual with the highest possible charge under the
circumstances of the case. See generally Caves, supra note 95, at 13–14 (describing this
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prosecutorial principles and ethics has yet to be published.
Accordingly, the Individual Principles contain very little discussion of
principled reasoning, ethical decisionmaking prerogatives, or
overarching prosecutorial goals for U.S. Attorneys.119 Instead, they
detail three reasons that a prosecutor should decline to press charges120:
a prosecutor should not press charges if she decides that “no substantial
[f]ederal interest would be served,” the individual should be
prosecuted in another jurisdiction (usually the state), or an “adequate
non-criminal alternative” exists.121
Given the amount of discourse on the lack of federal prosecutorial
guidance, it would seem fitting if the Individual Principles merely
stated these reasons without any further detail. Yet, that is not the
case—the next section of the USAM delves into each of the three
reasons, with a heavy focus on explaining the meaning of “no
substantial [f]ederal interest.”122 And although principles and ethics are
not clearly communicated, the explanation of “no substantial [f]ederal
interest” comes close to delineating a sort of ethical code for U.S.
Attorneys. The explanation generally guides prosecutors to decide
whether to press charges by considering the nature and seriousness of
the violation, the need for deterrence, and the probable sentence, along
with the individual’s culpability, criminal history, and personal
circumstances.123
phenomenon). Although tempered by Attorney General Holder in 2010, the guidance to charge
the highest possible offense still technically obligates federal prosecutors. See Memorandum from
Att’y Gen. Eric H. Holder to All Fed. Prosecutors, Department Policy on Charging and
Sentencing (May 19, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/
holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW9E-5MUY] (noting that the
determination of the highest possible charge should be “made in the context” of an individual
defendant’s personal circumstances).
119. See generally USAM, supra note 101, §§ 9-27.000–27.250 (discussing the considerations
which federal prosecutors should take into account when deciding whether to press charges); see
also Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, supra note 118 (same).
120. USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.220(A). These reasons assume that the prospective
defendant has violated a federal law and the prosecutor believes the admissible evidence is
“sufficient” to bring a successful case against the defendant. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. §§ 9-27.220–27.250.
123. Id. § 9-27.230(B). As noted above, the adequacy of the Principles regarding
prosecutorial discretion has been a subject of debate since their promulgation. See, e.g., Osler,
supra note 95, at 626–34 (discussing the shortcomings of the Principles—in particular, ethical
guidelines for prosecution). Different scholars have expressed different opinions about the
published rules. Leslie Donavan opines:
[T]he Justice Department’s published rules, while a slight improvement over the
previously inconsistent procedural and substantive decision-making process employed
by federal prosecutors, are too general and permissive to achieve the desired level of
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This discussion is actually the closest thing to an ethical code that
federal prosecutors have in charging individuals. By executive order,
each federal agency is responsible for regulating its own ethical
standards.124 The ethical standards for federal prosecutors are
accordingly referenced by the USAM;125 however, none of the
referenced standards are actually specific to prosecution.126 The
USAM mentions the American Bar Association’s ethical standards for
prosecutors, but because the DOJ has not adopted them, they are
referenced only as guidelines with which “familiariz[ation]” is
recommended.127
This lack of a distinct ethical guideline is likely by design. The
DOJ has explicitly stated that the Individual Principles are not
intended to “require a particular prosecutorial decision in any given
case.”128 One reason that the DOJ may not want to publish a more
detailed set of discretionary guidelines is the possibility that such
guidelines would open up prosecutorial discretion to enhanced review
or novel civil suits.
However, a middle ground exists. Demonstrated by the relatively
recently published federal standards for prosecuting corporate entities,
the DOJ can issue an office memorandum updating the Individual
Principles to include further principled guidance for charging
consistency and even-handedness in applying the criminal law to citizens at the state
and local level. Thus, they and the proposals upon which the guidelines are modeled
should not serve as prototypes for much needed local prosecutorial guidelines.
Leslie Donavan, Comment, Justice Department’s Prosecution Guidelines of Little Value to State
and Local Prosecutors, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 955, 958 (1981) (citation omitted).
124. See USAM, supra note 101, § 1-4.010 (summarizing the purpose of Executive Order
11,222, which was superseded by Executive Order 12,731 on October 17, 1990); Exec. Order No.
12,731, 55 Fed. Reg. 42,547 (Oct. 17, 1990) (directing agency heads to regulate ethical standards
specific to their agencies).
125. USAM, supra note 101, § 1-4.000.
126. See Office of Gov’t Ethics, Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
Branch, 5 C.F.R. pt. 2635 (2015) (regulating all executive branch employee behavior regarding
general conflicts of interest, required financial disclosures, and responsibilities for the
administration of the executive branch ethics program); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Human Resources
Order DOJ 1200.1: Chapter 11-1, Procedures for Complying with Ethics Requirements (Sept. 12,
2003), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/hr-order-doj-12001-part-11-ethics [https://perma.cc/A9WUGMRN] (providing general procedures for complying with the OGE standards within the DOJ).
127. USAM, supra note 101, § 9-2.101; see CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (outlining special ethical considerations
for prosecutorial charging discretion).
128. USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.120(B); see DAN K. WEBB, ROBERT W. TARUN, &
STEVEN F. MOLO, CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS § 16.04[1] at 16-11 (1993) (“The
government took pains to disclaim any notion that the Principles would be binding and
enforceable against [the DOJ] in the case of non-compliance.”).

AMSLER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

9/21/2016 3:20 PM

190

[Vol. 66:169

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

decisions, while sacrificing neither prosecutorial flexibility nor
decisionmaking authority.
B. Charging Corporations with Federal Crimes
When charging corporations with crimes, the DOJ’s guidance for
federal prosecutors is both more detailed and more revised than the
guidance for cases of individual crimes. In fact, one scholar has
remarked that “in no other area [than corporate crime] do federal
prosecutors provide such detailed guidelines to explain and to limit
(albeit in a non-binding way) how they exercise their discretion . . . .
Nor are there comparable areas in which prosecutors so frequently
make revisions to guidelines that constrain their own discretion.”129
The DOJ first published the Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations (Business Principles) in the USAM in 2008,130
almost three decades after the Individual Principles were published.131
The Business Principles had their start almost a decade prior to that,
however, with a memorandum written by then–Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder (known as the “Holder memo”).132 The memo
was drafted in response to complaints of a lack of uniformity in the
charging of corporations.133 It outlined eight factors (the “Holder
factors”) for prosecutors to consider when deciding whether to bring
charges against a corporate entity, including the “pervasiveness of
wrongdoing” in the corporation, any history of similar conduct by the

129. Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1796
(2011).
130. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Revises Charging Guidelines
for Prosecuting Corporate Fraud (Aug. 28, 2008), https:justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/August/
08-odag-757.html [https://perma.cc/8N73-XPEA].
131. The Individual Principles were first published in 1980. USAM, supra note 101, § 927.001.
132. Beth A. Wilkinson & Alex Young K. Oh, The Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations: A Ten-Year Anniversary Perspective, NYSBA INSIDE, Fall 2009, at 8.
The Business Principles were originally titled “Federal Prosecution of Corporations,” in
accordance with the title of the Holder memo. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Deputy Att’y
Gen. to All Component Heads and U.S. Att’ys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations
(June 16, 1999). Most often though, they were simply referred to as the “Holder memo.” The title
change came in 2003, with the first round of revisions to the Business Principles. See infra note
138.
133. Attorney General Holder revealed this motivation to the Wall Street Journal in 2006.
See Peter Lattman, The Holder Memo and Its Progeny, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2006),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/13/the-holder-memo [https://perma.cc/9NME-BZD3].
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corporation, and the corporation’s cooperation with the prosecution.134
Notably, factor seven was based on the “collateral consequences” of
bringing criminal charges against a corporation, “including
disproportionate harm to shareholders and employees not proven
personally culpable.”135
Though the Holder memo went into effect without contention, it
soon became the topic of much debate in the wake of the shocking
unravelings of corporate behemoths such as Enron and WorldCom.136
As a result, then–Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson updated
the Holder memo’s guidance with his own memorandum in 2003
(known as the “Thompson memo”).137 The Thompson memo revised
the Holder factors, primarily focusing on the “authenticity” of
corporate cooperation with the DOJ in the face of allegations of
wrongdoing,138 and added a factor to be considered by prosecutors
while deciding whether to charge a corporation.139 It also made the
consideration of these factors (which would eventually become the
Business Principles) mandatory for all federal prosecutors.140

134. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, supra note 132. Of course, application of the
Business Principles works in tandem with application of the Individual Principles, which apply to
all federal prosecutions. See USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.300 (Factors to Be Considered)
(“Generally, prosecutors apply the same factors in determining whether to charge a corporation
as they do with respect to individuals. Thus, the prosecutor must weigh all of the factors normally
considered in the sound exercise of prosecutorial judgment . . . .” (citations omitted)).
135. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, supra note 132.
136. See Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1449–50 (2007) (noting that the Holder memo was
“released . . . without much fanfare” because, in 1999, “the United States was experiencing
unprecedented business prosperity, and corporate prosecution was hardly en vogue”; however,
this all changed following the well-publicized discovery of a series of corporate scandals).
137. See id. at 1450 (“In response to this wave of business crime, the DOJ reprioritized the
prosecution of corporate entities. The Thompson Memo, the most significant of the three Deputy
Attorney General memos, was released in early 2003 as part of this renewed DOJ effort.”);
Wilkinson & Oh, supra note 130, at 8 (“The first-revised Principles, issued by then-Deputy
Attorney General Larry D. Thompson in 2003 . . . came on the heels of the Enron and WorldCom
scandals . . . .”).
138. Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Larry D. Thompson to Heads of Dep’t
Components and U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan.
20, 2003) (“The main focus of the revisions is increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the
authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation.”).
139. See id. (adding “the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the
corporation’s malfeasance” to the factors to be considered by prosecutors in charging a corporate
entity).
140. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that the
Thompson memo was binding on all federal prosecutors, while the Holder memo had merely
been advisory).
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The changes to the Holder factors prompted by the Thompson
memo generated lengthy debate, criticism, and proposed legislation.141
The majority of the debate surrounded the “corporate cooperation”
factor.142 Although little change existed between the literal discussions
of this factor in the Holder and Thompson memos, the general policies
of the Thompson memo were interpreted as implicitly encouraging
prosecutors to request attorney-client privilege waivers as a condition
of corporate cooperation.143 Eventually, the DOJ responded to these
concerns.144 In 2006, then–Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty
published another memorandum updating the guidance to prosecutors
(known as the “McNulty memo”).145 The McNulty memo “expand[ed]
upon [the DOJ’s] long-standing policies concerning how [to] evaluate
the authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation”146 by announcing that
corporations need not waive attorney-client and work product
protections to gain credit for cooperating with prosecutors.147
However, the McNulty updates to the Holder factors did not end
the debate,148 and two additional memoranda have since been

141. See generally Julie R. O’Sullivan, Does DOJ’s Privilege Waiver Policy Threaten the
Rationales Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine? A Preliminary
“No,” 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1237, 1238–43 (2008) (discussing the evolution of DOJ policy
regarding corporate attorney-client privilege waivers as a result of the vigorous opposition of
white-collar defense practitioners to the lasting practical implications of the Thompson memo).
O’Sullivan uses this discussion as the backdrop for her primary argument, which is that attorneyclient privilege is “virtually the last means by which corporations can resist government efforts to
impose potentially ruinous liability on corporate actors, whether or not such consequences are
warranted. . . . [This] account[s] for the bar’s full-throated roar in objection to DOJ policy.” Id. at
1251.
142. Id. at 1238–43.
143. Id. at 1240.
144. See Wilkinson & Oh, supra note 130, at 9 (“In response to these judicial and legislative
rebukes, then-Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty revised the Principles in 2006 . . . .”).
145. Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Dep’t Components
and U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (2006); Paulsen,
supra note 136, at 1451 (“In December 2006, the DOJ replaced the Thompson Memo with the
McNulty Memo . . . .”).
146. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, supra note 145, at 2.
147. See id. at 8 (“Waiver of attorney-client and work product protections is not a
prerequisite to a finding that a company has cooperated in the government’s investigation.”).
148. See, e.g., O’Sullivan, supra note 141, at 1241 (“The ink was barely dry on the McNulty
Memo before American Bar Association President Karen J. Mathis issued a press release stating
that these guidelines ‘fall far short of what is needed to prevent further erosion of fundamental
attorney-client privilege, work product, and employee protections during government
investigations.’” (citation omitted)).

AMSLER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD

9/21/2016 3:20 PM

193

published by the DOJ.149 In 2008, then–Deputy Attorney General
Mark Filip published an update to the Holder factors (known as the
“Filip memo”) focusing on “what measures a business entity must take
to qualify for the long-recognized ‘cooperation’ mitigating factor,”150
definitively clarifying that official DOJ policy bars prosecutors from
asking for waivers of attorney-client privilege.151 Nonetheless, some
scholars and commentators have argued that, despite the Filip memo’s
compelling language, nothing has actually changed in the practice of
investigating corporations: cooperation (in any real sense) still
practically requires corporations to waive their privilege and let their
attorneys divulge otherwise-confidential facts to prosecutors.152
The Filip memo also announced that, moving forward, the Holder
factors would be included in the USAM, partly as a symbol of their
stability and continuity.153 Thus, the Business Principles were
instituted, almost ten years after the Holder factors were originally
published. The most recent updates to these Principles come from a
2015 memorandum published by Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates
(known as the “Yates memo”).154 The Yates memo, for the first time in
over a decade, moved away from the focus on attorney-client privilege
waivers to emphasize “seeking accountability from the individuals who

149. Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Mark Filip to Heads of Dep’t Components and
U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008);
Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Sally Quillian Yates to the Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust
Div., et al., Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015).
150. Memorandum from Mark Filip, supra note 149, at 1.
151. See id. at 9 (“[P]rosecutors should not ask for such waivers [of attorney-client privilege]
and are directed not to do so.”); see also Wilkinson & Oh, supra note 130, at 9 (“The [Filip
memo] . . . completely removed consideration of a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the
payment of employees’ legal fees as factors in corporate charging decisions.”).
152. See Mark J. Stein & Joshua A. Levine, The Filip Memorandum: Does It Go Far
Enough?, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ id=1202424398325/TheFilip-Memorandum-Does-It-Go-Far-Enough? [https://perma.cc/8YKG-YU6X] (“The thrust of
the Filip Memo is that DOJ simply wants the facts . . . . The obvious problem is that the ‘facts’
uncovered in an internal investigation are actually an attorney’s distillation of numerous
interviews and documents and therefore [privileged] work product.”).
153. See Memorandum from Mark Filip, supra note 149, at 1. The memo states:
[E]arlier practice has drawn criticism from some quarters for implying that Department
policy is subject to revision with every changing of the guard. Accordingly, these
Principles please should henceforth be referred to as the Department’s “Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,” or the “Corporate Prosecution
Principles,” or by the relevant section of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, as other sections
typically are.
Id. at 2; see also USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.000 (containing the USAM publication of the
“Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations”).
154. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, supra note 149.
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perpetrated the wrongdoing” in corporate misconduct cases.155
Nonetheless, the same essential factors that federal prosecutors
consider in deciding whether to charge a corporate entity with a crime
remain unchanged,156 the vast bulk of which survived from the original
Holder memo in 1999.157
IV. GUIDANCE MATTERS FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS
A. Shaping Federal Prosecutions Through Charging Guidance
An examination of prosecutions shows a major difference in the
way that individuals and corporations are charged with crimes. Far
more often than in cases of individual crimes, corporations guilty of
criminal conduct will be offered deferred prosecution agreements
(DPAs).158 These agreements, “essentially . . . probationary
agreement[s] [where] the government files some kind of criminal
charge . . . but then agrees to hold the charge open as long as the
[defendant] successfully fulfills the terms of the agreement,”159 allow
corporations to avoid the consequences of federal prosecution.
For example, in 2009, Toyota was forced to recall millions of
vehicles after a deadly car accident revealed massive safety concerns
with vehicle design.160 Investigations eventually uncovered that
“unintended acceleration” had cost the lives of eighty-nine people

155. Id. at 1; see id. at 2 (“[T]his memo is designed to ensure that all attorneys across the
Department are consistent in our best efforts to hold to account the individuals responsible for
illegal corporate conduct.”).
156. USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.300(A). Although the factors remain the same, the 2015
updates to the Business Principles prompted by the Yates memo included the splitting of the
former factor (A)(4) (“the cooperation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents”) into two separate factors, now (A)(4)
(“the corporation’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents”) and (A)(6) (“the
corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing”). Id.
157. See id. § 9-28.300(A) (listing the ten factors that prosecutors should consider in reaching
a decision as to whether to bring charges against an entity); see also supra note 134 and
accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 232–41 and accompanying text.
159. Paulsen, supra note 136, at 1438.
160. Danielle Douglas & Michael A. Fletcher, Toyota Reaches $1.2 Billion Settlement to End
Probe of Accelerator Problems, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/economy/toyota-reaches-12-billion-settlement-to-end-criminal-probe/2014/03/19/
5738a3c4-af69-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_story.html [https://perma.cc/6747-9W3W]. The deadly
car accident that precipitated the vehicle recall involved a California Highway Patrol Officer and
three of his family members, “speeding out of control in a Lexus at more than 125 mph before the
car crashed, killing all four occupants.” Id.
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driving Toyota vehicles.161 To make matters worse, Toyota lied about
the cause of the unintended acceleration by claiming that the design
defect resulted from poorly designed floor mats that “trapped” gas
pedals.162 Toyota knew, but kept to itself, a second, more likely cause
of the deadly car accidents: “sticky” pedals.163
Toyota had been notified about a problem with their pedals more
than a year prior, but had chosen not to disclose the information to
U.S. manufacturers and authorities.164 During the 2009 recall, they tried
to conceal their fatal error by only supplying information about
defective floor mats and falsifying timelines to make it seem as if they
had only just become aware of a potential issue with their pedals.165
Had Toyota acted lawfully and revealed information regarding the
sticky pedals to U.S. authorities right away, lives might have been
saved.
Yet, despite Toyota’s deadly (in)actions, criminal cover-up, and
the deaths of eighty-nine people, the federal prosecution against
Toyota wrapped up last year with only a DPA.166 Why? Arguably, one
reason is that the Business Principles contain a wider range of flexible
guidelines and detailed criteria for prosecutors than do the Individual
Principles. The Business Principles’ guidance for prosecutors deciding
whether to charge a corporation is roughly twice the length of the same
guidance in the Individual Principles.167 Correspondingly, leading
161. Toyota ‘Unintended Acceleration’ Has Killed 89, CBS NEWS (May 25, 2010), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/toyota-unintended-acceleration-has-killed-89 [https://perma.cc/DJK6RYJW].
162. Douglas & Fletcher, supra note 160.
163. See id. (“Toyota knew that models it had not recalled had similar floor-mat
problems . . . . Also, the company hid from federal regulators a second cause of unintended
acceleration in its vehicles: a sticky gas pedal.”). The sticky pedals were “caused by plastic
material inside the pedal that could cause the accelerator to become stuck in a partially depressed
position.” Id.; see also Exhibit C, Statement of Facts at 4–5, United States v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
2014 WL 10584763 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2014) (No.14-CRIM-186), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2014/03/19/toyota-stmt-facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BGQ-SWCE]
[hereinafter DOJ Toyota Facts] (accompanying the Deferred Prosecution Agreement and
describing Toyota’s advance knowledge of the pedal defect in more detail).
164. See DOJ Toyota Facts, supra note 163, at 4–5 (describing Toyota’s advance knowledge
of the pedal defect).
165. Id.
166. Toyota could have been prosecuted for wire fraud, but the DOJ chose to present Toyota
with a DPA. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2014
WL 10584763 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2014) (No.14-CRIM-186), http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/legacy/2014/03/19/toyota-def-pros-agr.pdf [https://perma.cc/PDT6-7FTC].
167. The Business Principles’ guidance for prosecutors deciding whether to press charges
against a corporation is contained in USAM sections 9-28.200 to 9-28.1300, approximately sixteen
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scholar Brandon Garrett has stated that corporations are punished
“[n]ot by relying on strict and narrow sentencing guidelines, as with
individuals, but by using more flexible guidelines that may give the
biggest fish the best deals.”168
Most notably, the Business Principles guide federal prosecutors to
consider the collateral effects of prosecuting business entities.169 The
Business Principles devote an entire section170 to listing the extralegal
consequences that a prosecutor may want to consider, including effects
on innocent third parties and other sanctions that might accompany the
criminal charge.171 In contrast, the Individual Principles mention
collateral consequences exactly one time, with no depth or discussion,
and only in reference to evaluating whether another jurisdiction could
prosecute an individual more effectively.172

printed pages. The Individual Principles’ guidance for prosecutors deciding whether to press
charges against an individual defendant is contained in USAM sections 9-27.200 to 9-27.260,
approximately eight printed pages.
168. BRANDON GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS 14 (2014). Garrett goes on to explain that large firms “often receive deferred
prosecution agreements and pay lower fines, if any: 47 percent of those getting deferred
prosecution or non-prosecution agreements paid no fine at all” and that “[a]lmost every time
prosecutors explained how a fine was calculated, it was at the very bottom, or quite a bit below
the bottom, of the range suggested in the sentencing guidelines.” Id.
169. USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.1100 (Collateral Consequences).
170. This section is approximately one page in length of the sixteen pages of guidance in the
Business Principles for prosecutors deciding whether to press charges against a corporation. See
supra note 156 and accompanying text.
171. USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.1100(B) This comment states:
In the corporate context, prosecutors may take into account the possibly substantial
consequences to a corporation’s employees, investors, pensioners, and customers,
many of whom may, depending on the size and nature of the corporation and their role
in its operations, have played no role in the criminal conduct, have been unaware of it,
or have been unable to prevent it. Prosecutors should also be aware of non-penal
sanctions that may accompany a criminal charge, such as potential suspension or
debarment from eligibility for government contracts or federally funded programs such
as health care programs.
Id.
172. See generally USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.000. The sole mention of collateral
consequences in the Individual Principles reads: “[The prosecutor] should also be alert to the
possibility that a conviction under state law may, in some cases result in collateral consequences
for the defendant, such as disbarment, that might not follow upon a conviction under [f]ederal
law.” Id. § 9-27.240(B)(3). In the “substantial federal interest” factors in section 9-27.230, factor
(A)(7) (“[t]he probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted”) seems to
contemplate a discussion of collateral consequences; however, such discussion is missing from the
elaboration of factor (A)(7) in section 9-27.230(B)(8). Id. § 9-27.230. These discussions leave
much to be desired—collateral consequences exist for individual convictions as much as they do
for corporate convictions. See infra Part V.A.
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This is a significant difference. A line-by-line comparison of the
factors listed for consideration in the Individual and Business
Principles shows that most of the Business Principles factors are either
very similar to the Individual Principles173 or inapplicable in the
individual context.174 Of the three factors that do not fall into these
categories,175 the consideration of collateral consequences is not only
the most relevant to the prosecution of individuals, it is also the factor
with the best chance of having a meaningful effect on the current
federal criminal regime.
B. Limiting Federal Prosecutions Through Charging Guidance
Between 2004 and 2014, corporate prosecutions decreased by a
remarkable 29 percent,176 with the most substantial decline coming
173. Compare USAM, supra note 101, § 9-27.220(A)(3) (instructing that prosecutors should
decline to prosecute cases if “[t]here exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution”),
with id. § 9-28.300(A)(9) (requiring prosecutors to consider “the adequacy of remedies such as
civil or regulatory enforcement actions” when deciding whether to criminally charge a
corporation); compare id. § 9-27.230(A)(2) (requiring prosecutors to consider “[t]he nature and
seriousness of the offense”), with id. § 9-28.300(A)(1) (requiring prosecutors to consider “the
nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the public, and applicable
policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of corporations for particular categories
of crime” when weighing whether to criminally prosecute a corporation); compare id. § 927.230(A)(4) (requiring prosecutors to consider “[t]he person’s culpability in connection with the
offense”), with id. § 9-28.300(A)(2) (requiring prosecutors to consider “the pervasiveness of
wrongdoing within the corporation, including the complicity in, or the condoning of, the
wrongdoing by corporate management”); compare id. § 9-27.230(A)(5) (requiring prosecutors to
consider “[t]he person’s history with respect to criminal activity”), with id. § 9-28.300(A)(3)
(requiring prosecutors to consider “the corporation’s history of similar misconduct, including
prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it”); compare id. § 9-27.230(A)(6)
(requiring prosecutors to consider “[t]he person’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation or
prosecution of others”), with id. § 9-28.300(A)(4) (requiring prosecutors to consider “the
corporation’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents”).
174. Id. §§ 9-28.300(A)(5), (A)(10).
175. The three factors left include: USAM sections 9-28.300(A)(6) (“timely and voluntary
disclosure of wrongdoing” by the defendant), (A)(7) (“remedial actions” taken), and (A)(8)
(“collateral consequences” of prosecution). Id. § 9-28.300.
176. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DATA
REVEAL 29 PERCENT DROP IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF CORPORATIONS, at tbl.1
(Corporate Prosecutions Filed, FY 2004–2014) (Oct. 13, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/
crim/406 [https://perma.cc/3YZE-LZM4] [hereinafter TRAC CORPORATE DATA]. This data
tracks corporate charges and convictions from 2004 until 2014, and is available only as a result of
a case-by-case records search completed by Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
(TRAC), following a seventeen-year litigation effort under the Freedom of Information Act to
gain access to the information. Id. Compiled data for the number of corporate charges brought
prior to 2004 is limited. The USSC publishes the annual number of corporate convictions in its
Sourcebook, but these numbers do not include unsuccessful prosecutions, and thus are not a
conclusive source for the total number of corporate prosecutions filed. See id. at tbl.2
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after the Business Principles were finally published in the USAM in
2008.177 Similarly, corporate convictions have also decreased on
average.178 Data shows an all-time high of 304 convictions in 2000,
followed by a drop to an all-time low of 130 after the publication of the
Thompson memo in 2003, to a relative low of 162 in 2014 (see Figure 1
below).179
Figure 1. Corporate Criminal Convictions180
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(Corporations Convicted of Federal Crimes FY 1996–2014); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
ANNUAL REPORTS & SOURCEBOOKS ARCHIVES, http://www.ussc.gov/research-andpublications/annual-reports-sourcebooks/annual-reports-sourcebooks-archives
[https://perma.cc/W6MY-59VB]. Furthermore, some scholars have reported that the information
available from the USSC is limited in other ways, including missing and incomplete data for
corporate prosecutions generally. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 129, at 1805 (“[T]he Commission’s
datasheets are missing data important to the questions examined [in this article]. Problems with
Commission data have apparently been longstanding. . . . A landmark 1999 study. . . . warned
future researchers to ‘proceed with caution before drawing inferences’ from the Commission’s
organizational convictions data, where the Commission itself had acknowledged that its data ‘are
neither comprehensive nor representative.’” (quoting Cindy Alexander, Jennifer Arlen & Mark
A. Cohen, Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of
Public Firms, 42 J.L. & ECON. 393, 402 & n.26 (1999))).
177. TRAC CORPORATE DATA, supra note 176, at tbl.1; see also id. at tbl.5 (Corporate
Referrals, Prosecutions Filed and Convictions—Before and After Filip Guidelines).
178. Id. at tbl.1.
179. See id. at fig.2 (Corporations Convicted of Federal Crimes, FY 1996–2014) (data sourced
from USSC Sourcebooks). But see supra note 176 and accompanying text for discussion of
potential USSC data shortfalls.
180. TRAC CORPORATE DATA, supra note 176, at fig.2 (chart recreated for formatting;
original made by TRAC, based on data sourced from the USSC Sourcebooks).
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These numbers can be contrasted with the number of individual
convictions over the past decade, which has remained above 91 percent
of the prosecutions pursued since 2000, and above 92 percent since
2006.181 The rate of individual convictions further increased between
2008 and 2011, rising to 93 percent.182 Individual prosecutions over the
past decade followed a similar pattern, increasing by 9 percent from
2008 until 2011 (see Figure 2 below).183 The number of individual
prosecutions began decreasing in 2012,184 but this has been largely
attributed to recent policies that are directly tied to the current
administration.185 These recent policies include disfavoring nonviolent
drug offender186 and felony immigration prosecutions.187 Whether these

181. Data found in the U.S. Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Reports for the fiscal years of 2000
through 2013. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT’YS, ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORTS, https://www.justice.gov/usao/resources/annual-statistical-reports [https://perma.cc/
62E8-ESXL].
182. Id.
183. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT 7–8 (Fiscal Year 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/
legacy/2014/09/22/13statrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD83-H438] [hereinafter DOJ FY13 REPORT].
184. Id.
185. See David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27,
44–49 (2011) (discussing the link between the recent criminal-justice reform overtures and the
present budgetary constraints, and doubting whether the reform mindset will remain once the
budget changes with a new administration); Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences,
88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (2013) (“While the nation’s appetite for incarceration appears to be
waning, state, local, and federal criminal justice systems continue to adjudicate millions of cases
annually, and little reason exists to conclude that criminal prosecution and conviction will abate
as the preferred public response to misconduct.” (citations omitted)); Jeffrey A. Tucker, Obama
Starts Winding Down the U.S. Prison State—And About Time, Too, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 19, 2015),
http://www.newsweek.com/obama-starts-winding-down-us-prison-state-and-about-time-too381172 [https://perma.cc/N9VJ-79VT] (discussing President Obama’s efforts at prison reform in
the last years of his presidency).
186. See, e.g., Richard A. Serrano & Ian Duncan, Federal Authorities Eased up on Drug Cases
in 2014, BALT. SUN (Feb. 13, 2015, 3:40 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/federalworkplace/bs-md-federal-drug-cases-20150217-story.html
[https://perma.cc/9NAM-48CU]
(discussing Attorney General Eric Holder’s comments on easing prison overcrowding through
the new DOJ policies which started in 2013, and the resulting decrease in federal prosecutions).
187. See, e.g., Dan Cadman, Immigration Prosecutions’ Five-Year Trend Downward,
Particularly in the Interior, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Apr. 10, 2015),
http://cis.org/cadman/immigration-prosecutions-five-year-trend-downward-particularly-interior
[https://perma.cc/5NS2-V2PN]; see also TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE,
IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS FOR SEPTEMBER 2015 (Oct. 27, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/
traceports/bulletins/immigration/monthlysep15/fil [https://perma.cc/2SEX-B94X].
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policies will continue with the next administration remains an open
question.188

Individual Criminal Charges

Figure 2. Individual Criminal Charges189
70,000

67,864

65,000

68,591

68,926

63,118

63,042
60,062

60,000

58,702

59,228

2006

2007

61,529

55,000
50,000
2005

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Fiscal Year

V. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
A. Guidance for Considering Collateral Consequences
Based on the data above, the institution of the Holder factors and,
to an even larger extent, the publication of the Business Principles has
had a curtailing effect on the federal prosecution of corporate crime.190
This curtailing effect was both purposely intended and stabilized by the
publication of the Business Principles in the USAM. Thus, the numbers
of prosecutions and convictions of corporations have decreased, even
as the same numbers have increased for individuals.191 The major
differences between the Individual Principles and the Business
Principles (or lack thereof) demonstrate that the discussion of
collateral consequences in the Business Principles is at least partially
responsible for this difference.192 Thus, the crucial question becomes:

188. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. Thus, these administration-specific policies,
currently serving to curb individual prosecutions, cannot be compared to the curbing guidance
instituted by the Business Principles, which were made stable and permanent by publication in
the USAM in 2008. See supra Part III.B.
189. DOJ FY13 REPORT, supra note 183, at 8 (Criminal Chart 2.1—Criminal Cases Filed)
(chart recreated for formatting; original made by U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for
U.S. Attorneys based on DOJ data).
190. See supra Part IV.B.
191. See supra Part IV.B.
192. See supra Part IV.A.
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Why consider the collateral consequences of charging corporations
with crimes but not those of charging individuals with crimes?
In reference to considering the collateral consequences of
prosecuting a corporation, the Business Principles state, “[P]rosecutors
may take into account the possibly substantial consequences to a
corporation’s employees, investors, pensioners, and customers, many
of whom may . . . have played no role in the criminal conduct.”193 The
Business Principles go on to add that “[p]rosecutors should also be
aware of non-penal sanctions that may accompany a criminal charge,
such as potential suspension or debarment from eligibility for
government contracts.”194 Thus, according to the USAM, the official
reasons for considering the collateral consequences of charging
corporations with crimes stem from concerns for innocent third parties
and fears about the economy as a whole.195
The DOJ began to officially consider the collateral consequences
of prosecuting businesses with the Holder memo, after the corporate
scandals of the 1980s and 1990s.196 However, the DOJ’s focus on these
collateral consequences intensified after the collapse of Arthur
Andersen, and many scholars theorize that it was this event which
solidified the importance of collateral consequences in the DOJ’s

193. USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.1100(B).
194. Id.
195. DOJ officials supporting the consideration of collateral consequences in the context of
corporate criminal charges have also stressed these factors. For example, in 2012, the Assistant
Attorney General remarked:
[I]n reaching every charging decision, we must take into account the effect of an
indictment on innocent employees and shareholders . . . . I personally feel that it’s my
duty to consider whether individual employees with no responsibility for, or knowledge
of, misconduct committed by others in the same company are going to lose their
livelihood if we indict the corporation . . . . And, in some cases, the health of an industry
or the markets are a real factor. Those are the kinds of considerations in [corporate]
crime cases that literally keep me up at night, and which must play a role in responsible
enforcement.
Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the New York City Bar
Association (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech1209131.html [https://perma.cc/KQZ7-UYSV]. Scholars have also noted these concerns. See
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 400–02, 407–08 (1981)
(describing various “externalities” attaching to corporate prosecutions).
196. See supra Part III.B; see also Sharon E. Foster, Too Big to Prosecute: Collateral
Consequences, Systemic Institutions and the Rule of Law, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 655, 664
(2015) (“[F]ollowing the savings and loan crisis of the 1980’s and the Enron scandal in 2001, the
DOJ adopted a written policy of taking collateral consequences into consideration in deciding
whether to bring criminal charges against systemic institutions.”).
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corporate charging policy.197 In fact, Arthur Andersen’s collapse, and
the subsequent attention that the DOJ paid to collateral consequences
in the corporate crime context, has been dubbed “the Andersen
effect.”198
But the consequences of prosecuting businesses are not alone in
having collateral effects. Just like criminal convictions of corporations,
criminal convictions of individuals affect “far more than the convicted
individual.”199 The DOJ itself recognizes that “almost every conviction
of an individual[] will have an impact on innocent third parties.”200 So,
the collateral consequences of prosecuting individuals clearly
encompasses the first concern of the DOJ when prosecuting
corporations: innocent third parties. What about the DOJ’s second
concern, the economy as a whole?
When it comes to individual prosecutions, the effects on innocent
third parties cannot be separated from the harm caused to the economy
as a whole. Federal and state convicts, and their families, face
consequences of conviction including increased health concerns, social
stigma, licensing bans, housing restrictions, and a lack of employment
prospects.201 When viewed at the individual level, these effects of
incarceration may seem less weighty than the collateral effects of
prosecuting a corporation. However, such a perspective would be
shortsighted.
This is primarily because “too many Americans” are in prison.202
With the number of individual incarcerations propelled to mass levels
in recent decades,203 the collateral consequences of conviction have

197. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 196, at 662 (“The job losses from the closure of Arthur
Andersen and other economic impact factors created some concern and facilitated the changed
policy at the DOJ to consider collateral consequences, but only for systemically important
institutions.”).
198. Alex B. Heller, Corporate Death Penalty: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Indictment of
SAC Capital, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 763, 770 (2015).
199. Logan, supra note 185, at 1108. Logan goes on to explain that family and friends of
convicts frequently must endure “spill-over” effects of a loved one’s incarceration like stigma,
violence, and disdain, in addition to serious health and financial issues. Id. at 1108–09; see also
supra Part I.B.
200. USAM, supra note 101, § 9-28.1100(B).
201. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text; see also supra note 172 and accompanying
text.
202. See supra Part I.B.
203. Id.; see also Henderson, supra note 58, at 105–07.
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resulted in cyclical poverty,204 inequality,205 and reinforced criminal
behavior.206 Each of these results has constituted a prime contributor
to present-day social-justice breakdowns.207 For example, a recent
economics study showed that being incarcerated for a felony (a time
period of a year or more) “reduce[d] the odds of post-prison
employment by 24 percent and increase[d] the odds of living on food
stamps by 5 percent.”208 Furthermore, some research has shown that
the longer an individual is incarcerated, the greater the chance that the
individual will turn to crime when finally released from prison.209 These
and other difficulties have led scholars to conclude that America’s mass
incarceration epidemic has “produced a new social group” of convicts
and former convicts who have been cast out from society.210 This social
divide is especially prevalent with regard to racially disadvantaged

204. See Coates, supra note 59 (“It is estimated that between 30 and 50 percent of all parolees
in Los Angeles and San Francisco are homeless. In that context—employment prospects
diminished, cut off from one’s children, nowhere to live—one can readily see the difficulty of
eluding the ever-present grasp of incarceration . . . .”); Stephanos Bibas, The Truth about Mass
Incarceration, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/424059/massincarceration-prison-reform [https://perma.cc/E3CN-PEXY] (“[P]rison does much to draw
inmates away from lawful work. In the month before their arrest, roughly three quarters of
inmates were employed, earning the bulk of their income lawfully. . . . helping to pay for rent,
groceries, utilities, and health care. But prison destroys their earning potential.”).
205. See, e.g., John Tierney, Prison and the Poverty Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/science/long-prison-terms-eyed-as-contributing-topoverty.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/2PHM-9FF7]. Tierney writes:
When researchers try to explain why AIDS is much more prevalent among blacks than
whites, they point to the consequences of incarceration, which disrupts steady
relationships and can lead to high-risk sexual behavior. When sociologists look for
causes of child poverty and juvenile delinquency, they link these problems to the
incarceration of parents and the resulting economic and emotional strains on families.
Id.
206. See Bibas, supra note 204 (“[P]risons are breeding grounds for crime. Instead of
working, . . . most prisoners are forced to remain idle . . . . [P]rison clusters together neophytes
and experienced recidivists, breeding gangs, criminal networks, and more crime.”).
207. See Henderson, supra note 58, at 106 (“People of color and the poor are overrepresented
among [prison] population[s], leading to the implication that minority-group and class bias infects
the criminal justice system . . . . America’s carceral crisis is widely considered the most critical civil
rights and civil liberties issue of the present . . . .” (citations omitted)).
208. Bibas, supra note 204 (discussing a study by Michigan economics professor Michael
Mueller-Smith).
209. See id. (discussing a study by Mueller-Smith which found that “long sentences on
average breed much more crime after release than they prevent during the sentence”).
210. See Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, DÆDALUS:
Summer 2010, at 8, https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/pubContent.aspx?d=808
[https://perma.cc/M2RR-VL6Q] (“America’s prisons and jails have produced a new social group,
a group of social outcasts who are joined by the shared experience of incarceration, crime,
poverty, racial minority, and low education.”).
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minorities and low-income populations, constituting a major area of
modern civil rights concerns.211 These concerns extend to the next
generation as well—studies show that children with an incarcerated
parent are more likely to suffer academically, mentally, socially, and
physically than their peers.212
In short, the cumulative effects of prosecuting individuals are
significant. Yet, U.S. Attorneys consider such effects in the context of
charging corporations with crimes, but not when deciding when and
how to charge individuals with crimes. Given the overfederalized state
of the U.S. criminal regime and the too many Americans in prison,213 it
might be time to level the playing field, and expand the consideration
of collateral consequences to individual defendants. As the revered
Judge Learned Hand once commanded: “Thou shalt not ration
Justice.”214
B. Practical Implications: Arguments for and Against the
Consideration of Collateral Consequences
Opponents may argue that the collateral consequences of
prosecution should be considered for corporations, and not for
individuals, because of the different natures of corporations and
individuals.215 Primarily, a corporation is not a natural person.
Therefore, in addition to potentially encompassing many individuals, a
corporation itself cannot actually commit a crime.216
211. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
212. See Paola Scommegna, Parents’ Imprisonment Linked to Children’s Health, Behavioral
Problems, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Dec. 2014), http://www.prb.org/Publications/
Articles/2014/incarcerated-parents-and-childrens-health.aspx
[https://perma.cc/EXS8-YHU3]
(discussing how “U.S. children of incarcerated parents are an extremely vulnerable group, and
much more likely to have behavioral problems and physical and mental health conditions than
their peers”); Tierney, supra note 205 (discussing a study by Yale sociologist Christopher
Wildeman which found that “children are generally more likely to suffer academically and socially
after the incarceration of a parent”).
213. See supra Part I.
214. IRVING DILLIARD, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED
HAND, at xix (1952) (describing a quote from a speech for the Legal Aid Society of New York on
February 16, 1951, in reference to ensuring that defendants have the counsel needed to ascertain
fair trials).
215. See, e.g., Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1880–81
(2005) (“Yet corporations are by nature a vastly different type of criminal than a drug addict or
juvenile offender.”).
216. See generally Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 411–15 (2007) (discussing how corporations can “act” only through the
actions of the individuals working within them).
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However, the argument that the distinguishable nature of
corporations supports a different set of prosecutorial considerations is
greatly reduced by the fact that the American criminal system
personifies corporations for purposes of criminal treatment. Most
countries do not hold corporations responsible for crimes committed
within the corporate domain,217 but the United States has chosen a
different system.218 Both Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have
decided that corporations can, and will, be held responsible for crimes
like individuals.219 As long as the law treats corporations and
individuals similarly for purposes of crime, the argument that their
dissimilar natures support different prosecutorial treatment carries less
force.220
This premise similarly addresses another possible argument that
corporations and individuals should be treated differently: some may
argue that, because corporate employees may be prosecuted criminally
even when the corporation itself is not,221 the prosecution of corporate
entities should not be compared to the prosecution of individuals.
Instead, one might argue, individual prosecutions should be compared
to the prosecution of individual corporate employees. However, as
stated above, federal criminal law purports to see no difference
between corporations and individuals—they are all “persons.”222 It
217. See Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the
Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 129
(2008) (“Few other Western countries impose entity liability, and those that do impose it
comparatively infrequently and under the threat of far less serious punitive consequences.”).
218. Id.
219. The U.S. Supreme Court held that corporations can be held liable for any crime under
the doctrine of respondeat superior in 1909. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United
States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–96 (1909). Congressional legislation also indicates that corporations are
liable for all legal violations, just like individuals. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (stating that the
definition of “person” throughout the United States Code includes corporate entities).
220. Cf. Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 908–31 (2011) (discussing generally the
abrogation of many corporate constitutional rights under the law). Furthermore, although
absolute corporate criminal responsibility through respondeat superior is currently the de juris
rule in the United States, some scholars have argued that it should be eliminated or modified. See,
e.g., Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 526–33
(2006).
221. See supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat,
What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 97–104 (2004) (discussing the critiques of corporate criminal
liability generally and reasons why liability might be better imposed solely on individual corporate
actors).
222. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. Furthermore, it is often difficult to simply
substitute a comparison of prosecuted corporate employees for the prosecution of corporations
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therefore makes no difference whether corporate employees are
charged if the corporation has not also been charged because a
“person” who has committed a crime has still gone (deliberately)
unpunished. Under the law at least, individuals and corporations are
on the same playing field. It is under prosecutorial charging guidance
that they are treated differently.
Regarding the consideration of collateral consequences in
particular, when former Attorney General Eric Holder discussed the
consideration of economic effects as a potential reason not to prosecute
corporations in 2013,223 public backlash followed.224 “Too big to fail” or
“too big to jail” became the mantra of those who disagreed with the
DOJ’s policy of considering the collateral effects of criminally charging
corporations.225 Consideration of collateral consequences in this
manner, denouncers correctly asserted, “create[s] a public perception
that the legal system is unfair.”226 Deciding whether or not to prosecute
criminal acts on the basis of a corporation’s wealth is akin to a system
in which “the economically weak get prosecuted, [and] the

themselves because of the typical “collective” nature of corporate crimes. For further discussion
on this point, see generally Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L.
REV. 1789 (2015).
223. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Hearing
on Oversight of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 113th Cong. (Mar. 26, 2013), (unpublished hearing
transcript), http://congressional.proquest.com:80/congressional/docview/t65.d40.03060003.t03?
[https://perma.cc/2USG-Y9NT] (responding to questions of Senator Grassley).
224. See, e.g., Danielle Douglas, Holder Concerned Megabanks Too Big to Jail, WASH. POST
(Mar.
6,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/holder-concernedmegabanks-too-big-to-jail/2013/03/06/6fa2b07a-869e-11e2-999e-5f8e0410cb9d_story.html
[https://perma.cc/3ZCB-RZS2] (discussing Holder’s remarks and the “too big to fail”
implications); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Realities Behind Prosecuting Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Mar. 11, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/big-banks-go-wrong-butpay-a-little-price/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5JVF-6RZ9] (discussing same).
225. See, e.g., William D. Cohan, Justice Dept. Shift on White-Collar Crime Is Long Overdue,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/business/
dealbook/justice-dept-shift-on-white-collar-crime-is-long-overdue.html [https://perma.cc/6CC8NQ6Z] (describing “too big to jail” and the “Holder Doctrine” as “horribly misguided”).
226. Foster, supra note 196, at 658. Another argument against “too big to jail” revolves
around a belief that this idea led to the “failure to prosecute any [major] institution or person for
the events that led to the financial crisis and all the ensuing social devastation.” Roger Parloff,
Eric Holder’s Business Legacy: ‘Too Big to Jail’?, FORTUNE (Sept. 26, 2014), http://fortune.com/
2014/09/26/eric-holders-business-legacy-too-big-to-jail [https://perma.cc/87JS-CTQT]. However,
the legal and factual situation surrounding this claim is far more complicated than the argument
facially implies. Much of the questionable activity leading to the 2008 financial crisis was just
that—questionable. Whether any of the subsequently contemplated prosecutions could have
succeeded if they had been pursued is far from settled. Thus, placing the blame for the lack of
prosecutions here on “too big to jail” is an oversimplification.
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economically powerful do not.”227 A general argument against the
consideration of collateral consequences, in any context, may therefore
be that such considerations are inequitable.
However, this argument is premised upon the assumption that
collateral consequences are considered for one group (wealthy
corporations) and not for another (individuals). Applied in this
manner, the consideration of collateral consequences undoubtedly
raises concerns. But this is not the only way in which the federal system
could apply considerations of collateral consequences. If federal
prosecutors were guided to consider the collateral effects of charging
individuals with crimes, in addition to considering the same for
corporations, some of the concerns for fairness may be eliminated.
Of course, some would argue that expanding the considerations of
federal prosecutors in this manner would only lead to further disparate
results. An increase in disparity usually results from any increase in the
discretionary powers of an official.228 Here, adding a consideration for
federal prosecutors when charging individuals would likely broaden
discretionary power, as opposed to limiting it, because it would expand
the issues that prosecutors could consider when making charging
decisions.
This Note does not address the question of whether the American
system of broad prosecutorial discretion is inherently good or bad. But
it is important to remember that our prosecutors have ethical duties as
“minister[s] of justice.”229 With this duty in mind, expanding
considerations to ensure equal application of the law is harmonious
with the prosecutor’s role.
Lastly, current practices and trends point toward a growing legal
emphasis on the collateral effects of individual incarcerations. After
decades of rulings that deemed individual collateral consequences to
be inconsequential,230 the U.S. Supreme Court held in 2010 that lawyers
must advise their clients when deportation is a secondary consequence
of a guilty plea.231 This decision may indicate a shift in the Court’s view

227. Foster, supra note 196, at 658.
228. See, e.g., supra Part I.
229. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
230. See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1806–16 (2012) (discussing judicial rulings which evidenced
a lack of constitutional restraint on collateral consequences, up until the 2010 Padilla ruling).
231. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
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of collateral consequences, which have traditionally been thought of as
less important than the direct consequences of conviction.232
Additionally, the connection between the consideration of
collateral consequences and the granting of DPAs is extremely
relevant to the topics discussed in this Note. DPAs, now primarily used
to avoid corporate prosecutions (as in the Toyota case233), were
originally developed as a more judicious way to prosecute juveniles.234
The idea was to “avoid the stigma associated with formal processing
and the resultant change in self-image, associations, and behavior
associated with the negative societal reaction to the stigma.”235 During
the 1960s, the use of DPAs expanded, and they became popular
methods for prosecuting drug offenders.236
Despite these humane origins, today federal prosecutors are six
times more likely to offer a DPA to a corporation than to an actual
human being.237 This is fundamentally attributable to prosecutors’
consideration of collateral consequences when charging corporations
with crimes.238 The practice has garnered attention from public

232. See Logan, supra note 185, at 1113 (“Padilla in particular might also signal a desire on
the part of the Court to do away with the long-criticized doctrinal divide between direct and
collateral consequences more generally, requiring courts . . . to ‘focus[] on the importance of
particular consequences rather than their criminal or civil labels.’” (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor
to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1147 (2011))); see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366
(stating that the Court is not definitively classifying deportation as a collateral consequence here
“because of its close connection to the criminal process”).
233. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
234. Greenblum, supra note 215, at 1866.
235. Id. (quoting GENNARO F. VITO & DEBORAH G. WILSON, THE AMERICAN JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 22 (1985)).
236. Id.
237. This number is calculated from two figures. First, the number of pretrial diversions for
individual defendants in 2012, which was 0.9 percent. Mark Motivans, FEDERAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 2012—STATISTICAL TABLES, at 12 tbl.2.3 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fjs12st.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG5D-P66X]. Second, the percentage of DPAs and
nonprosecution agreements for corporations from 2004 to 2009, which was 5.7 percent. U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS
USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE
EFFECTIVENESS 16 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/299781.pdf [https://perma.cc/9854ZJ5W]. See United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 42 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing the
sources for the above numbers as a basis for comparing the number of DPAs offered to
individuals and corporations).
238. See, e.g., Greenblum, supra note 215, at 1880–83 (describing the “transplant” of DPAs
from individuals to corporations, and how economic considerations played a factor in that
transplant).
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opponents in recent years,239 and now may be a focus of judicial
attention as well.
In a recent opinion, Judge Emmet Sullivan, a federal district judge
for the District of Columbia, wrote about his disappointment in the
DOJ’s disproportionate employment of DPAs.240 Integrating collateral
consequences, Judge Sullivan emphasized that “society is harmed at
least as much by the devastating effect that felony convictions have on
the lives of its citizens as it is by the effect of criminal convictions on
corporations.”241 In the end, the recurring theme is simply this: the
consequences of prosecuting individuals matter.
CONCLUSION
With the advent of collateral-consequence considerations in
corporate criminal prosecutions, the DOJ has paved the way for
enhanced guidance to be issued to federal prosecutors for charging
individuals with crimes. A discussion of collateral consequences in
individual charging guidance, already included in corporate charging
guidance, could have important and far-reaching effects on the federal
criminal regime. More importantly, it could remedy some of the
unfairness presented by the current system in which federal
prosecutors are guided to consider a superior set of factors before
charging corporations. As Judge Sullivan noted: “[P]eople are no less
prone to rehabilitation than corporations.”242
It might be argued that the solution to this problem is to constrain,
not increase, the consideration of collateral consequences. But why
should fairness demand that everyone be worse off? In the interest of
both “[ad]minister[ing] justice”243 and alleviating the massincarceration epidemic, federal prosecutors should be expanding

239. See, e.g., Jonathan Sack, Deferred Prosecution Agreements—The Going Gets Tougher,
FORBES (May 28, 2015, 11:25 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2015/05/28/deferredprosecution-agreements-the-going-gets-tougher [https://perma.cc/PEE5-AALX].
240. See Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d at 42 (“Congress provided the deferredprosecution tool without limiting its use . . . . [T]he Court is disappointed that deferredprosecution agreements or other similar tools are not being used to provide the same opportunity
to individual defendants to demonstrate their rehabilitation without triggering the devastating
collateral consequences of a criminal conviction.”).
241. Id. at 46.
242. Id.
243. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
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equitable considerations, not eliminating them. In short, we should
“not ration Justice.”244

244.

DILLIARD, supra note 214, at xix (emphasis added).

